The Next Chapter of Africa-China Climate Cooperation – The Diplomat

Nearly five years have passed since the adoption of the Declaration on China-Africa Cooperation on Combating Climate Change at the Eighth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC 8) in 2021. Since then, discussions have often centered on simple indicators to reflect on the progress made – for example, the number of projects announced, the size of new investments, and the scale of renewable energy commitments.

At first glance, Development Reimagined’s China-Africa Climate Action Tracker provides just this. The tracker captures 246 publicly announced climate actions across 50 African countries between 2022 and the first half of 2026, including nearly 49 GW of renewable energy in the development pipeline, clean technologies, clean transportation, and, more recently, critical minerals. However, while these results are important,  they capture only part of a partnership that has evolved significantly over the past five years.

Beyond the numbers, the tracker reveals three structural shifts that have been taking place since FOCAC 8: that cooperation is becoming more investment-led; more closely linked to green industrialization; and increasingly focused on building long-term institutions. As FOCAC 10 approaches in 2027, these shifts have important implications for how future Africa-China climate cooperation should be designed and evaluated.

From Infrastructure Delivery to Long-term Investment 

The first shift is a move from contractor-led cooperation toward longer-term investment partnerships.

For many years, Africa-China cooperation in the energy sector was largely associated with engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) projects. Often having bid and won procurement processes funded by African governments or banks, Chinese companies built power plants, transmission lines, and other infrastructure that supported African countries’ energy ambitions. That model remains important and continues to contribute to Africa’s energy transition.

However, the China-Africa Climate Action Tracker suggests that the partnership is evolving. Investment and equity-led projects, EPC-plus projects, and technology transfer are becoming increasingly prominent, while the share of traditional EPC-only projects is declining. And, although Chinese state-owned enterprises such as Power China and Energy China continue to play a dominant role in project delivery in Africa, a growing number of Chinese private firms are expanding their presence through investments in local manufacturing and production capacity. 

For example, in Zambia, a Chinese firm announced a lithium battery manufacturing project in 2024 with an investment of approximately $30 million. The facility, located in the Zambia-China Jiangxi International Economic and Technical Cooperation Zone, is now operational. This illustrates how Africa-China climate cooperation can extend beyond infrastructure delivery to support local green manufacturing and industrial development.

Climate Cooperation Is Becoming a Green Industrial Agenda

The second shift is even more interesting. Africa-China climate cooperation is increasingly extending beyond individual renewable energy projects toward the development of integrated green industrial value chains

Hence, although new solar, wind, and hydropower energy infrastructure continue to dominate Africa-China climate cooperation, the tracker also highlights the rapid emergence of critical minerals as an essential component of climate cooperation.

Development Reimagined began systematically tracking Africa-China critical minerals projects in 2025 and has already identified close to 20 projects involving lithium, graphite, rare earth elements, and other strategic resources. More significantly, eight of the nine countries hosting these critical mineral projects also have renewable energy projects. This overlap points to opportunities that Chinese and African firms are taking up to extend cooperation beyond mineral extraction. 

African countries are increasingly pursuing and implementing national industrial strategies that connect renewable energy, mineral processing, and manufacturing. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is developing battery value chains. Nigeria is expanding clean technology manufacturing. Tanzania is positioning itself as a multi-mineral processing hub. 

Looking at Africa’s green manufacturing progress, projects that involve Chinese stakeholders span electric vehicle assembly, battery manufacturing, energy storage, solar PV production, and related supply chains. These examples demonstrate growing interest among Chinese companies in localizing production in Africa markets rather than relying solely on exports of finished products. 

That said, some of this manufacturing pipeline remains at the memorandum of understanding, feasibility, planning or pre-construction stage. Announced projects don’t always become operational manufacturing capacity. In addition, feasibility studies often miss the opportunity presented by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which could help make green manufacturing investments more commercially viable through access to the much larger continental market.

Cooperation Is Moving Beyond Individual Projects

The third trend is perhaps the least visible but could prove the most important. Climate cooperation is increasingly being built through and reinforcing African initiatives and institutions, not just project-by-project.

Since 2022, the tracker has recorded more than 40 climate “exchanges,” including strategic partnerships, technology cooperation, capacity-building initiatives, and industry collaborations. These initiatives receive less attention than utility-scale renewable energy projects, but they could prove fundamental in building the institutional foundations necessary for long-term economic transformation.

For example, pairing Chinese expertise in solar technology and energy storage with training for African engineers and technicians could do more than bring new clean-energy systems online. It could help build the local skills needed to operate and maintain these systems, support local businesses and expand access to reliable electricity over the long term.

Looking Ahead to FOCAC 10

So what do these three trends suggest for the next phase of Africa-China climate cooperation?

Our view at Development Reimagined is that while the number of megawatts installed will remain an important measure of progress – especially in the context of the 300 GW 2030 renewable energy goal announced by African leaders in the 2023 Nairobi declaration – the  next stage of Africa-China climate cooperation presents an opportunity for FOCAC 10 to do more than announce the next generation of projects. It can help shape the conditions under which these projects deliver lasting value.

The first priority could be turning a growing pipeline into projects that are delivered. The real test for any announced project comes afterwards – including the need to securing affordable finance, reach construction, begin operations and ultimately deliver economic and climate benefits. FOCAC 10 could place greater emphasis on this implementation journey, including clearer mechanisms to track progress and identify where policy, financing, or technical support is needed. This would help shift the focus from the volume of commitments towards the results they generate.

The second priority could be to continue to connect individual projects to the bigger opportunity of green industrialization. Investments in renewable energy, critical minerals, EVs, batteries, and solar PV are beginning to form the building blocks of new green industrial value chains across African countries. More energy projects need to be directed to support local production, technology transfer, skills development, and value addition. Chinese companies are already exploring this shift, while African countries are developing policies to attract and anchor these investments. FOCAC 10 can help strengthen this convergence, with the AfCFTA providing an important platform for linking national manufacturing investments to a larger continental market.

The third is to invest even after a project is built. A solar farm, manufacturing facility, or battery plant can create important economic and climate benefits, but its longer-term contribution depends on the capabilities around it, including skilled workers, local suppliers, research institutions, effective regulators, and access to finance. These foundations are less visible than a new project, but they determine whether investments can be sustained, replicated and scaled. 

Future Africa-China climate cooperation therefore has an opportunity to put greater emphasis on building these capabilities alongside physical infrastructure, while also responding more fully to African countries’ priorities on climate adaptation.

These three priorities, although they might be new, do not, in fact, require a departure from the progress made since FOCAC 8. Rather, they build on how the partnership is already evolving. 

FOCAC 10, to be held in 2027, can help move Africa-China climate cooperation into its next active phase: one where success is measured not simply by what is announced or built, but by what actual power is delivered, what industrial goods are produced locally and what industrial capabilities are growing on the continent.