In recent weeks, thousands of Bulgarians have filled the streets of the capital, Sofia, protesting against the country’s accession to the Eurozone, which is due to take effect at the beginning of next year. Approved by the European Commission on 4 June after much stalling and negotiation, the decision has ignited a fierce public debate spanning fiscal policy and national identity. Demonstrators chanting ‘No Thank You to the Euro’ and denouncing ‘Euro-colonialism’ have tried to storm the parliament and set fire to the EU mission. Across the city, spray-painted slogans in support of the national currency, the lev, suggest that the argument is far from settled.
Once a loyal state in the Soviet bloc, Bulgaria set its sights on the West in the 1990s, with both ex- and anti-Communist forces steering it toward the Euro-Atlantic alliance. It joined NATO in 2004 followed by the EU three years later. For the political establishment, membership of the Eurozone is the logical next step, granting the country a formal place in the Eurogroup and perhaps eventually allowing it to outgrow its peripheral position. The push for accession is driven by a broad electoral grouping, including the governing centre-right party, the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), plus its coalition partners in the centre-left Socialist Party (BSP) and nationalist-populist There is Such a People (ITN). Initially planned for 1 January 2024, the switch was delayed by two years because of soaring inflation, which surpassed 15% in the wake of the pandemic.
The delay emboldened critics of the transition, as did Bulgaria’s seemingly intractable political crisis, with seven snap elections and eight prime ministers over the past four years. Following the outbreak of major anti-corruption protests in 2020, which helped to topple the government of GERB grandee Boyko Borissov, the country has seen a series of fragile coalitions and power-sharing agreements. GERB remains the largest party, yet with its poll ratings reduced to around 25% it must now rely on various fairweather allies to maintain its majority. The current Prime Minister, Rosen Zhelyazkov, presents himself as a stabilizing force with a mandate to bring prices down and support small businesses – yet he is seen by many as a puppet of Borissov: weak, corrupt, and desperate to ingratiate himself with Brussels.
Proponents of the Eurozone, both inside and outside Bulgaria, point out that the lev has long been tied to the euro. In 2020 Bulgaria joined the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, designed to maintain a stable exchange system between the euro and the national currencies of other EU countries – effectively rendering ‘monetary sovereignty’ a nostalgic fantasy. By completing the transition, they argue, Bulgaria would see a surge in tourism and foreign investment. The deeper issue, of course, is Bulgaria’s position in the Western power sphere. In Brussels and Washington, the country has long been seen as the EU’s ‘weakest link’ on account of its fragile political institutions – susceptible to Russian economic and diplomatic pressure, especially in areas such as energy, infrastructure and the media and information sectors. Accession is part of a broader attempt to fortify NATO’s eastern border against such influence and unify ‘the West’.
The general public, however, see things differently. More than 60% say they do not view Russia as a threat. Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, Moscow has become increasingly unpopular in Bulgaria, with almost 34% taking a negative view of it; yet this does not translate into support for Western alignment. There is no majority for an alliance with NATO and the EU. And there is strong opposition to further involvement in the war – which has prompted the government to send arms and ammunition in a clandestine manner, via third countries. Close to 30% of people say they do not know whether they favour the West or the East. On the question of joining the euro, 51% of Bulgarians are opposed and 43% in favour.
Thus far, the Bulgarian left – which includes a wide spectrum of parties grouped together under the BSP’s ‘United Left’ electoral coalition – has mostly sided with the establishment on the question of European integration, allowing the far-right Revival party to establish itself as the main opposition. Founded in 2014, Revival rose from political underdog to the third largest party in the legislature after the 2022 election, in which it campaigned on an anti-vaccine, anti-LGBT, anti-EU platform. Now commanding about 15% of the vote, it has played a leading role in the recent protests. The party has joined the Bulgarian President Rumen Radev in calling for a referendum on the euro question: a proposal that the government has voted down. It has also tried to obstruct the process in parliament, occupying the podium during a crucial vote and bombarding the government with no-confidence motions. Some of the party’s senior figures recently met with a delegation from the US Republicans and proposed tying the lev to the dollar rather than the euro.
While the far right’s opposition to the currency change may be driven in part by opportunism, it can nonetheless invoke precedents. Like Bulgaria, Greece strained to meet the Maastricht criteria – implementing various neoliberal reforms – before it adopted the euro in 2002. Yet the accumulation of excessive public debt and relatively slow growth, as a result of its peripheral role in the EU economy, led to a decade-long political-economic crisis that reverberated throughout the continent, culminating in a set of austerity packages that destroyed the country’s fiscal sovereignty. The Bulgarian Central Bank has sought to downplay such comparisons by framing the Greek debacle as a result of political mismanagement rather than a structural problem.
The other obvious parallel is Croatia, which in 2023 became the twentieth state to adopt the euro. Many blamed the new currency for rising living costs, as businesses rounded up the price of basic goods like food and clothing when converting from the kuna. This, along with increases in energy bills and taxes, prompted a political reckoning with the ruling party, HDZ. Stripped of its parliamentary majority in the 2024 elections, it was forced to form a coalition with the far-right Homeland Movement, which was given three state ministries and a host of other concessions. Popular unrest continued this January, when a wave of consumer-led boycotts of supermarkets swept the country, forcing the coalition to introduce price caps on dozens of products.
In Bulgaria, the elite consensus on the necessity of the euro is far removed from public opinion. By treating dissent as disinformation, the government has avoided addressing legitimate political anxieties. The gap has only widened in recent months, as Trump’s erratic policies have shaken up financial markets and destabilized currencies, while introducing uncertainties about the US–EU relationship. For years, Bulgaria has been unable to transcend its status as the poorest state in the EU. Voter turnout fell to a historic low of 34% at the last election. Thanks to constant emigration, the population has shrunk by more than 2.2 million since its peak in the late 1980s. The process is a familiar one in Europe’s outlier nations: economic stagnation, growing disillusionment and far-right radicalization. An unwanted new currency may accelerate these trends.
Read on: Owen Hatherley, ‘Bulgarian Dreams’, Sidecar.
